We provide a simplified test to determine if choice data from a two-commodity consumption set satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP), and thus the preference or utility maximization hypothesis. We construct an algorithm for this test and illustrate its application on experimental choice data.
Introduction
Much theoretical and applied work in microeconomics presumes that a consumer's observed choices result from the maximization of some utility function or preference relation subject to a binding budget. The centrality of this presumption has motivated attempts to construct and implement falsifiable tests of this 'utility hypothesis'.
However, applying the appropriate theoretical tests for finite data sets-such as the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP) or the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP)-to field data presents some difficulties. Varian (1988) showed that axiomatic tests of the consistency of field data requires the analyst to observe all (and not just a subset of) the prices and quantities associated with the commodity space or impose strong behavioral assumptions such as separability.
One way around such problems, especially in the context of controlled experimental methods, is to restrict the dimension of the commodity space. Several studies which have utilized various axioms of revealed preference to test whether experimental choice data satisfies the preference or utility maximization hypothesis do precisely this. In an early study, Battalio et al. (1973) analyzed the choices of institutionalized subjects in a token economy, work later refined and extended by Cox (1997) to incorporate labor supply and portfolio choice. Sippel (1997) While the SARP is the appropriate test to determine if a finite set of observed demand choices is consistent with the maximization of a strictly concave utility function (Matzkin and Richter, 1991) , the GARP allows for demand behavior that is somewhat more general and is consistent with the maximization of a piecewise-linear concave utility function (Varian, 1982) . Checking whether a set of m demand observations satisfy the SARP or GARP requires the identification of both direct and indirect chains of revealed preference between any k of the chosen bundles for k = 2, . . . , m.
But when choice is from a two-commodity space, Rose (1958) proved that satisfying the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP), which requires only the pairwise comparison of demanded bundles, is equivalent to satisfying the SARP.
In this paper, we provide an analogous shortcut to check for GARP-consistency in terms of a Weak Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (WGARP) when the commodity space consists of two goods. Thus a violation of the GARP can be demonstrated in the simple accessible form of a pairwise violation. Section 2 contains definitions and our theoretical result, that choice from a two-commodity consumption set that is WGARP-consistent is also GARP-consistent. We present an algorithm for checking the WGARP in Section 3 and apply this algorithm to the data of Andreoni and Miller (2002) . Section 4 concludes.
Theoretical Result
Let IR n + be a consumption space, where n ≥ 2 indexes the number of commodities. A subject facing a price vector
constitutes an observation. Let S be a finite set of m observations on a subject, i.e.,
Definition 1. The set S satisfies the Weak Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (WGARP) if for any two choices x i and x j ,
Following Varian (1982) , if x i is chosen when x j is also affordable, we write
where R 0 is the binary relation directly revealed preferred to. If x i is chosen when 
of length j ≤ m drawn from S, it is the case that
Denoting the transitive closure of the binary relation R 0 by R, 1 an alternative statement of the GARP is 'If x i Rx j , then it is not the case that
Proposition. When the consumption space contains two commodities (i.e., n = 2), the WGARP is equivalent to the GARP.
Proof . Sufficiency follows from the definition of GARP. We show necessity by induction on the length of the sequence following Rose (1958) . The theorem is trivially true for any sequence of length one. Suppose it is true for any sequence of length j ≥ 2.
) satisfies the WGARP, and it is the case that [
For each price vector, normalize the price of the second commodity to unity. 
In all cases we need to show that
To show this in case (a), note that
1 For any preference relation R 0 on a commodity space X, let R 0 denote the set of all possible transitive extensions of R 0 , i.e., for all R
The transitive closure of R 0 is then the smallest transitive extension of R 0 defined as
Then the first and third terms on the righthand side are non-negative by assumption and the second and fourth terms are non-negative because of WGARP. Thus
) is non-negative because the first term on the righthand side is non-negative by WGARP and the second by assumption. Therefore, substituting for p j , we get
Finally for case (c), note that
Then the first, third and fourth terms on the righthand side are non-negative by WGARP, while the second term is non-negative by assumption. Thus
Why is it that in the two-commodity case there must be a pairwise violation of GARP if there is any violation of GARP at all? At the heart of this result lies a crucial difference between a choice scenario with two versus more than two commodities: in the case of two goods and a k-wise violation of GARP, the k budget lines can be ranked from steepest to flattest by normalizing the price of the second good, something not possible when there are three or more commodities. Then the inequalities in the k-wise GARP violation can be shown to impose restrictions implying at least one pairwise GARP violation.
To illustrate this, consider the simplest instance when there are three observations
3 )} and where all prices and chosen bundles are distinct.
Suppose that 3-wise GARP is violated: x 1 R 0 x 2 and x 2 R 0 x 3 hold, while x 3 P 0 x 1 . The inequalities expressed by these revealed preferred relations are 
Algorithm and Application
Given a data set of m price vectors and m corresponding consumption bundles, we provide an algorithm to calculate the number of WGARP violations in a given set of observations.
Let U be an m × m matrix where a typical element u ij is defined as
The elements of U then represent the R 0 and P 0 relations: u ij = 1 iff x i R 0 x j but not
Next define another m × m matrix V whose typical element v ij is defined as
Finally define W as an m × m matrix with element w ij defined as
Then the data contain We apply this WGARP algorithm to Andreoni and Miller's (2002) data from Sessions 1-4, their base-case scenario. 4 In the first two columns of Table 1 , we list (by subject number and reported number of GARP violations) the 13 subjects out of 142 who violated the GARP. Each subject faced eight budgets and selected bundles consisting of payments to self and to an anonymous partner, a two-good commodity space. In the third column of Table 1 we provide the corresponding number of WGARP violations calculated using our algorithm. Since Theorem 1 establishes that WGARP implies GARP, and because GARP-consistent choice can be rationalized by a piecewise linear utility function which is continuous, concave and monotonic, we conclude that the WGARP-consistent choice of the remaining 129 subjects is similarly rationalized.
In columns four and five of Rose's (1958) result implies that two-commodity WARPconsistent choice is SARP-consistent; consequently, two-commodity WARP-consistent choice can be rationalized by a continuous, strictly concave and strictly monotonic utility function. As pointed out by Matzkin and Richter (1991, p. 299), the GARP implies a weaker notion of rationality than SARP; in particular, GARP-consistent 3 For spreadsheet applications, the algorithm can be shortened by using conditional statements to replace the V and W matrices. A spreadsheet template is available upon request from the authors. 4 The data can be downloaded from http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/∼andreoni/getdata.html.
choice can be rationalized by any constant utility function (which is trivially continuous, concave and monotonic), and by our Theorem 1, the same can be said of WGARP. However, because the number of WGARP and WARP violations is identical for the Andreoni and Miller data set, 5 the full force of SARP-consistency may be used to conclude that the 129 subjects behaved as if they were maximizing a continuous, strictly concave and strictly monotonic utility function. As can be seen from Table 1 , there are generally more violations of the GARP than the WGARP since the former counts both pairwise and k-wise violations (k > 2), while the latter only counts pairwise violations. To see a concrete instance of this, consider the choices of subject 3 reproduced in Figure 2 . The eight budgets faced by the subject are labeled from B 1 to B 8 , while the choices made under each budget are shown by the bundles numbered from 1 to 8. These observed choices are summarized in terms of the revealed preference relations R 0 and P 0 in Table 2 . 
Conclusion
The growing use of experimental methods in economics and renewed interest in the behavioral foundations of choice has led to a number of recent studies testing experimental choice data for consistency with the axioms of revealed preference. The GARP has played a pivotal role in several studies. In this paper, we defined an alternative axiom, the WGARP, which requires only the binary comparison between chosen bundles. Paralleling Rose's (1958) findings concerning the equivalence between the WARP and SARP, we have shown that choice from a two-commodity consumption set that satisfies the WGARP also satisfies the GARP (and vice-versa). Because checking for GARP-consistency requires an iterative procedure such as Warshall's (1962) algorithm to compute the transitive closure of a revealed preference relation, while WGARP involves only pairwise comparisons of chosen bundles, our finding offers a conceptually simpler test of whether choices over a two-commodity space satisfy the hypothesis of preference maximization (as satisfying the GARP implies).
Consequently, the WGARP is particularly valuable in contexts where transparency in identifying violations of preference rationality is useful, such as classroom demonstrations of the axioms of revealed preference.
Additionally, we have provided some intuition as to why the case of two goods is special in that any violation of GARP must entail one pairwise violation of GARP.
We have also provided an algorithm to test for WGARP-consistency. On a cautionary note, ours is an equivalence result for WGARP-and GARP-consistency. While data which contain at least one GARP violation (and hence fails the GARP) must 
